‘External Stresses’ and Violence Mitigation in Fragile Contexts: Setting the Stage for Policy Analysis by Schultze-Kraft, Markus
IDSEVIDENCE REPORTNo 36
Addressing and Mitigating Violence
‘External Stresses’ and Violence Mitigation in 
Fragile Contexts: Setting the Stage for Policy 
Analysis
Markus Schultze-Kraft
October 2013
‘EXTERNAL STRESSES’ AND VIOLENCE MITIGATION IN FRAGILE 
CONTEXTS: SETTING THE STAGE FOR POLICY ANALYSIS
Markus Schultze-Kraft
October 2013
This is an Open Access publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted 
use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are clearly credited.
First published by the Institute of Development Studies in October 2013
© Institute of Development Studies 2013
IDS is a charitable company limited by guarantee and registered in England (No. 877338).
The IDS programme on Strengthening Evidence-based Policy works across seven key themes. Each theme 
works with partner institutions to co-construct policy-relevant knowledge and engage in policy-influencing 
processes. This material has been developed under the Addressing and Mitigating Violence theme.
The author would like to thank Robin Luckman, Mick Moore and Jeremy Lind for their helpful comments on 
previous versions of this paper. 
The development of this material has been led by IDS who holds the copyright.
The material has been funded by UK aid from the UK Government, however the views expressed do not  
necessarily reflect the UK Government’s official policies.
AG Level 2 Output ID: 358
1 
Contents 
Executive summary 2 
1 ‘External stresses’: what’s behind a term? 3 
2 ‘External stresses’ and ‘new’ forms of violence: the case of transnational 
cocaine trafficking 6 
3 Tackling transnational trafficking and insecurity: beyond buffering 
institutions and enhanced regional cooperation 9 
4 Implications for policy analysis 10 
References 11 
 
 
2 
Executive summary 
Following on from the World Bank’s World Development Report 2011 on conflict, security 
and development, a debate has emerged about the role of so-called ‘external stresses’ in 
generating ‘new’ forms of violence and insecurity in poor and fragile countries. The Bank 
posits that the combination of internal stresses (e.g. low income levels, high youth 
unemployment) and external stresses (e.g. cross-border conflict spillovers, illicit drug 
trafficking) heightens the risk of different forms of violence, which are not confined to inter-
state and civil war but range from communal conflicts to criminal violence and terrorism. 
This perspective is useful in as much as it makes explicit that instability and political disorder 
are not only related to domestic weaknesses of fragile states, but are also conditioned by 
outside forces. Yet the binary internal–external/fragility–vulnerability model that underpins the 
World Bank’s analysis of external stresses appears to be too limited to inform strategies to 
address the challenges that arise from pressures as diverse as illicit transnational trafficking, 
price and resource shocks, and cross-border conflict spillovers. 
A more comprehensive and nuanced framework for policy analysis is called for, based on the 
recognition that external stresses: (a) tend to involve external, internal as well as 
transnational actors and variables that are often interrelated; (b) create both losers and 
winners, and can promote the interests of powerful state and non-state groups in and outside 
of the country or world region under ‘stress’; and (c) do not all have the same kind of impact 
on states and societies in terms of generating violence. 
 
3 
1 ‘External stresses’: what’s behind a term? 
The World Bank’s influential World Development Report 2011 (WDR 2011a) on conflict, 
security and development highlights the centrality of ‘internal stresses’ and ‘external stresses’ 
for generating insecurity and increasing the risk of violence in fragile countries. Among the 
major internal stresses identified by the Bank are: economic factors such as low income 
levels, youth unemployment, and corruption; security-related factors such as legacies of 
armed conflict; and justice-related factors such as human rights abuses and impunity. Major 
external stresses are linked to military invasion and occupation, external support for domestic 
rebels, cross-border conflict spillovers, international terrorism and criminal networks, price 
shocks, and perceptions of global inequity and injustice in the treatment of ethnic or religious 
groups. 
Fundamentally concerned with the human development and security of over a quarter of the 
world’s population that live in fragile and conflict-affected states, the Bank identifies 
‘organized crime and trafficking, civil unrest due to global economic shocks [and] terrorism’ 
as responsible for spawning ‘new’ forms of violence that have ‘supplemented continued 
preoccupations with conventional war between and within countries’ (WDR 2011b: 1). 
Adopting a ‘stressor’ approach drawn from contemporary resilience thinking,1 the report 
argues that the risk of ‘new’ forms of conflict and violence stems from the ‘combination of the 
exposure to internal and external stresses and the strength of the “immune system”, or the 
social capability for coping with stress embodied in legitimate institutions... Countries and 
subnational areas with the weakest institutional legitimacy and governance are the most 
vulnerable to violence and instability and the least able to respond to internal and external 
stresses’ (WDR 2011b: 7). 
As Michael Watts puts it, ‘the centrepiece of the vulnerability model [employed by the Bank] 
is the concept of institutional capacity and legitimacy. Societies that rely on elite pacts, 
coercion, and patronage risk cyclical violence’ (Watts 2012: 120). The World Development 
Report 2011 posits that such countries lack sufficiently robust ‘buffering institutions’ with the 
capacity to absorb external shocks and prevent the shockwaves from wreaking political, 
social and economic havoc. In short, in the Bank’s analysis, state fragility (internal) combines 
with vulnerability (external) to create situations in which the risk and adverse impacts of ‘new’ 
forms of violence on states, societies and citizens increase significantly. 
This narrative about external stresses and state vulnerability is useful in as much as it makes 
explicit that instability and political disorder are not merely related to domestic weaknesses of 
fragile and conflict-affected states, but are also conditioned by outside forces. Using the 
language of ‘internal’ versus ‘external’ and portraying the state as a normally ‘healthy’ entity 
that comes under stress from both internal and external actors and variables allows the Bank 
to communicate its argument in easily understandable terms to a broad, non-specialist 
audience. However, by doing so, it runs the risk of over-simplifying complex issues and 
framing the analysis in a way that reduces its usefulness for policy purposes. It also runs the 
risk of uncritically reiterating dominant contemporary discourses on global and transnational 
problems, such as the one on transnational organised crime and illicit trafficking. 
                                               
1
 Originally developed by scholars working on systems ecology, in the past few decades resilience ‘as a science of complex 
adaptive systems and an operational strategy of risk management’ has ‘infiltrated vast areas of the social sciences, becoming a 
regular, if under-theorized, term of art in discussions of international finance and economic policy, corporate risk analysis... 
development policy... and national security’ (Walker and Cooper 2011: 143). Applied resilience thinking, such as in the World 
Development Report 2011, is essentially based on the assumption that shocks and threats to political systems and institutions 
cannot be fully predicted and prevented for they are constitutive and inherent features of social life and organisation. ‘The 
catastrophic event (natural, social or economic)... becomes a sign not of the occasional failure to predict, prevent and manage 
crisis but of the systemic limits to public management and state planning’ (ibid: 154). In this vein, it is held that a ‘strategy of 
resilience replaces the short-term relief effort – with its aim of restoring the status quo ante through post-catastrophe 
reconstruction – with a call to permanent adaptability in and through crisis’ (ibid: 154). 
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National and multilateral crime-fighting and counter-trafficking agencies tend to operate on 
the basis of the assumption that with the intensification of globalisation after the end of the 
Cold War, states have come under increasing attack from transnational organised criminal 
groups and networks. These processes have been analysed as ‘illicit globalization’ (Andreas 
2011) and are described as the ‘dark side of globalization’ (Heine and Thakur 2011) in which 
transnational criminal organisations and trafficking networks exploit the institutional and other 
weaknesses of states for illicit economic purposes, making a mockery of national sovereignty 
by operating across international borders, playing off one national jurisdiction against 
another, and using violence to regulate global black markets. The World Development 
Report 2011 adopts this framework, although it also acknowledges that ‘international 
mechanisms that focus on global or transnational issues... have tended to neglect impacts on 
fragile states’ and that ‘policies are often only suitable for the larger, more capable states’ 
(WDR 2011a: 217). The existing prohibitionist UN-administered international drug control 
regime and the counter-narcotics policies that flow from it would be a case in point, but the 
report stops short of elaborating on this politically sensitive issue. 
There is no doubt that illicit trafficking and contraband, cross-border insecurity, and 
commodity price and resource shocks – among other transnational and global pressures – 
create very difficult situations in many developing countries, and particularly in fragile states. 
The problems range from drug trafficking-related violence epidemics and food riots to 
regionalised conflict and political regime change or breakdown. Yet it is crucial to recognise 
that these complex processes: (a) tend to involve external, internal and transnational actors 
and variables that are often interrelated; (b) create losers as well as winners, and can 
promote the interests of powerful state and non-state groups in and outside of the country or 
world region under ‘stress’; and (c) do not all have the same kind of impact on states and 
societies in terms of generating violence. 
Thus, the issue is not merely that state fragility (internal) and vulnerability (external) combine 
to create significant and sometimes overwhelming levels of ‘stress’ in affected countries, 
which can heighten the risk of violence; it is that internal and external stresses actually relate 
to and reinforce one another, for they are interconnected through transnational actors and 
processes – i.e. ‘regular interactions between state and non-state actors across national 
boundaries [that contribute to shaping] political, social [and economic] outcomes at home, 
abroad, and in an emerging global governance sphere’ (Orenstein and Schmitz 2006: 482). 
This transnational dimension, which is crucial for understanding illicit flows and their 
associated organised criminal networks as well as regional conflict spillovers and other 
external stresses, does not figure as prominently as it should in the World Bank’s analysis. 
The World Development Report 2011 also fails to acknowledge that in some circumstances, 
stresses – external and internal – can have stabilising effects, in that they work to the benefit 
of, or indeed are the making of, powerful state and non-state groups in the affected countries 
or world region (Andreas 2011; Abraham and van Schendel 2005). Here we have to remind 
ourselves that ‘illegal flows are not external forces that, arrow-like, fly past supine borderland 
societies. On the contrary they are actively domesticated and incorporated into borderland 
projects’ (van Schendel 2005: 55). Beyond the impact of illicit flows like drug trafficking on 
the structuring of social, political and economic relations in borderlands and between them 
and the central state, they also have effects on the national body politic and governance 
structures, and on wider state–society relations. ‘The image of states as simply reactive, 
responding [or not] to the growth of clandestine transnational flows, is misleading because it 
understates the degree to which states actually structure, condition, produce and enable 
clandestine border crossings [and illicit flows]’ (van Schendel 2005: 59). 
To illustrate this point, one state’s external stress can result from a neighbouring state’s 
activation of a ‘safety valve’ by tolerating or actively facilitating (unauthorised and 
uncontrolled) economic migration with the aim of reducing youth unemployment or increasing 
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the volume of annual remittances. Bangladesh has been cited as an example of this, with 
large numbers of Bangladeshis being pushed to migrate to India in search of work and 
income (van Schendel 2005). 
Also, external stresses, such as illicit drug trafficking, are not always associated with armed 
conflict and violence. As discussed in more detail below, depending on the type of policy a 
government chooses to tackle such stresses, they can actually lead (at least temporarily) to 
development gains in producer and transit countries, often in peripheral and desperately poor 
internal agricultural frontier communities and borderlands that span international boundaries 
(Goodhand 2009). In settings where drug trafficking is driving large-scale violence, such as 
presently in Mexico, this is related both to external factors (such as the massive flow of 
Andean cocaine through Mexico to the US consumer market) and internal ones (such as 
Mexico’s transition from a closed, one-party political system that operated an illicit ‘joint 
extraction regime’ (Snyder 2006) together with trafficking groups, to a more democratic and 
pluralist system deeply entangled in the US-led ‘global war on drugs’). 
In sum, while intuitively appealing, the binary internal–external/fragility–vulnerability model 
that underpins the World Bank’s analysis of external stresses appears to be too limited to 
inform strategies to address the challenges experienced by states and societies arising from 
external pressures as diverse as illicit transnational trafficking, price and resource shocks, 
and climate change. There is a risk that the World Development Report 2011 is contributing 
to the over-simplification of complex issues and the uncritical reiteration of dominant 
discourses about pressures on states, thereby limiting the policy options available (which are 
discussed in more detail below) to tackle what are undoubtedly serious problems for fragile 
and poor countries, including risks related to the outbreak or perpetuation of different types of 
violence. 
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2 ‘External stresses’ and ‘new’ forms of 
violence: the case of transnational cocaine 
trafficking 
The World Development Report 2011 adopts a very broad notion of violence, which it defines 
as the ‘use or threat of physical force by groups, including state actions against other states 
or against civilians, civil wars, electoral violence between opposing sides, communal conflicts 
based on regional, ethnic, religious, or other group identities or competing economic 
interests, gang-based violence and organized crime, and international, nonstate, armed 
movements with ideological aims’ (WDR 2011b: 39). The core of the argument is that these 
different forms of ‘21st century violence [do] not fit the 20th-century mold. Interstate war and 
civil war are still threats in some regions, but they have declined over the last 25 years... 
Many countries and subnational areas now face cycles of repeated violence, weak 
governance, and instability’ (WDR 2011b: 2). 
Echoing the ‘new wars’ narrative (Kaldor 2012; Münkler 2002), the Bank perceives violence 
and armed conflict in their ‘new’ guise as more diffuse, recursive and globalised than during 
the Cold War era, and instrumental for achieving economic gains for private violence 
entrepreneurs such as warlords and drug traffickers. It also perceives violence and armed 
conflict as less driven by states and clearly identifiable organised non-state groups with 
political and social reform agendas, though the World Development Report 2011 does not 
rule out the existence of such agendas. 
Concerned with the huge death toll and the destabilisation of countries as diverse as Mexico, 
Guinea-Bissau and Afghanistan (in terms of their geographic location and levels of 
development and institutional strength), the World Development Report 2011 emphasises 
the highly adverse effects of illicit flows on national governance, institutions and 
development. It is well known that the trafficking and sale of illicit drugs are presently among 
the most lucrative transnational criminal activities (Allum and Gilmour 2012), which provides 
huge opportunities for traffickers to bribe police, customs and other officials, and to fuel 
corruption, mostly in source and transit countries. Under certain circumstances, these 
activities are also associated with high levels of what the Bank would label ‘new’ forms of 
violence of criminal origin. While the report seems to present illicit flows as epitomising 
external stresses, it does not elaborate on the differences between the broad range of 
external stresses it has identified in terms of their destabilising and violence-generating 
potential and impact. 
As in the case of licit global economies, the illicit drug business functions on the basis of the 
principle of demand and supply, and is structured along transnational commodity chains. For 
cocaine, for example, the chain extends from coca cultivation and cocaine production in the 
source countries in the Andean region of South America, to export (or ‘trafficking’, as cocaine 
is an illegal commodity) to North America and Europe via transit countries – a process that is 
run by transnationally networked criminal organisations and their partners in the state and in 
wider society – and finally, to the illegal wholesale and retail sale and consumption of the 
drug in destination markets. 
Most of the violence associated with the global cocaine business occurs at the production 
and transit stages (particularly the latter). For instance, Colombia’s protracted internal armed 
conflict and pervasive criminal violence are largely driven by the cocaine business; Mexico’s 
drug wars have killed an estimated 60,000 people in the past seven years alone; and in 
2009, Guinea-Bissau saw its president killed in what some observers allege could have been 
a vendetta between local politicians and military officers involved in cocaine trafficking to 
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Europe along the West Africa route. In the large consumer markets of the North, where the 
price of cocaine reaches its peak, trafficking-related violence is much less dramatic, while 
incarceration rates of so-called ‘drug offenders’ – dealers and users – are high, especially in 
the United States. Different types and combinations of local, national and transnational non-
state and state actors are involved in the cocaine business at different points in the chain. 
They include (some) coca farmers,2 cocaine processors, traffickers, corrupt law enforcement 
and customs officers, shipping agents, political elites, and end-users. 
The example of the transnational cocaine business illustrates that the challenges posed to 
states by drug trafficking, and its potential to generate violence, should be conceptualised 
both from the vantage point of internal and external stresses. In source countries such as 
Colombia, the cocaine industry and its potential for generating violence is essentially 
associated with ‘internal’ factors such as the lack of state presence in large swathes of the 
country’s rural areas, governance weaknesses, and the long-standing existence of armed 
non-state and criminal groups and networks. However, key participants in the cocaine 
industry (as well as in the Colombian government’s efforts to curb the illegal trade, with major 
US support, through forced coca crop eradication, drug shipment interdiction and law 
enforcement) are transnationally networked. The ‘pull factor’ – i.e., global demand for 
Colombian cocaine – is external. 
In the cases of Mexico and Guinea-Bissau, which do not produce cocaine but are located on 
two major trafficking routes from the Andean region to North America and Europe 
respectively, the notion of external stresses applies more readily. The starting point of the 
transnational cocaine trafficking chain lies outside of the national jurisdictions of the two 
countries (and, in the case of Guinea-Bissau, in another continent). As transit countries, with 
relatively little (though growing) domestic cocaine consumption, they are not a significant part 
of the pull factor. But both Mexico and Guinea-Bissau are experiencing major destabilising 
impacts from the transnational cocaine business, which undermines their governance 
structures and generates violence (in the case of Mexico, on a very large scale). However, it 
is crucial to recognise that in both countries, externally driven destabilisation and violence 
are shaped and enhanced by existing internal weaknesses such as pervasive corruption, 
weak justice systems, high rates of impunity, the existence of organised criminal groups with 
links to the state, and weak accountability and transparency. Transnationally networked 
groups in Mexico and Guinea-Bissau, whether non-state or state actors, benefit from cocaine 
trafficking through their respective countries either because they act as powerful 
intermediaries, brokers and transportistas in the illicit business or because they gain access 
to sizeable external counter-narcotics and security aid, which can inadvertently contribute to 
the propping up and stabilising of illegitimate and/or ineffective national political regimes and 
states (Felbab-Brown and Forest 2012). 
In sum, whether cocaine trafficking carries the potential to generate violence, disrupt 
governance and block or reverse development appears to depend on the effectiveness and 
willingness of the state to control production and trafficking (‘gate-keeper state’) and the 
policy it chooses to achieve control (hard or soft-line approaches); it also depends on the 
degree to which key domestic state and non-state groups, including criminal organisations, 
are transnationally networked and linked into global trafficking chains and counter-trafficking 
efforts. While there is abundant evidence that, in the longer run, transnational drug and other 
illicit flows can have devastating political, social and economic effects in source and transit 
countries, it must not be overlooked that they can also (at least temporarily) contribute to job 
creation and income generation for underprivileged sectors of the population, to political 
stability (which might well be of an authoritarian and non-democratic nature), and the 
                                               
2
 It is important to note that not all coca farmers in the Andean region participate in the illicit cocaine business as suppliers of 
coca leaf. Especially in Bolivia, but also in Peru and Colombia, large quantities of coca leaf are produced for traditional, cultural 
and licit economic purposes, such as for the manufacture of coca tea (mate de coca). 
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emergence of centre–periphery ‘political equilibriums’ (Goodhand 2009). Finally, it is 
paramount to distinguish between the different types of external stresses identified in the 
World Bank’s World Development Report 2011, as they are not readily comparable in terms 
of their destabilising and violence-generating potential, and in how they relate to, and are 
reinforced by, internal stresses and transnational factors. 
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3 Tackling transnational trafficking and 
insecurity: beyond buffering institutions 
and enhanced regional cooperation 
As noted earlier, underpinning the World Bank’s analysis of external stresses is a 
vulnerability model centred on the institutional capacity and legitimacy of fragile/vulnerable 
states. In the absence of sufficiently robust, effective and legitimate buffering institutions, 
fragile states or states with a legacy of violent conflict are said to risk cyclical, recursive 
violence. This risk is heightened due to the impact of external stresses stemming from 
various sources such as illicit trafficking, cross-border violence spillovers, and commodity 
price and resource shocks. According to the Bank’s analysis, the region in which a state is 
located defines not only the type of threats it is likely to face but also the potential support 
available to it to help withstand the destabilising impact of external stresses. Hence, 
‘[regional] collaboration and shared administrative services could create... the net gains in 
capacity that would allow all participating states to better handle organized violence’ (WDR 
2011a: 233). 
While this reasoning might apply in some cases – such as with ‘uncontrolled’ economic 
migration and refugee flows, and even cross-border support to rebels provided that an 
agreement to stop such support is negotiated and adhered to by the governments of the 
states in question – it does not readily apply where the nature of the external stresses is 
determined by sweeping processes of (illicit) globalisation, such as in the case of drug 
trafficking, and resource and commodity price shocks. It is unlikely that tackling these issues 
through creating stronger domestic buffering institutions and enhancing regional cooperation 
will be sufficient. It is further questionable whether such a strategy would be politically 
feasible. Arguably, the global and transnational nature of these activities and processes and 
of the actors involved transcends the regional context, which needs to be factored into the 
policy responses; it is this same situation that provides significant opportunities for key 
(criminal) state and non-state groups, including in borderlands, to enrich themselves and 
amass ‘illicit elite political resources’ (Moore 2011). 
Underlying the notion of buffering institutions is the assumption that major transnational and 
global pressures can be neutralised by building stronger domestic institutions, presumably at 
the central government level; and that there is no or only little agency on the part of 
transnationally networked groups in the affected countries in the making and promotion of 
such pressures. However, in many fragile states this is not the case (or if it is, it is only to a 
limited degree). On the other hand, the idea that enhanced regional cooperation could 
effectively shield fragile states from external stresses fails to acknowledge the empirical fact 
that whole world regions (e.g. Central America/Mexico and West Africa) are presently being 
overwhelmed by immensely powerful global illicit flows, such as the large-scale trafficking of 
cocaine (as already discussed). Numerous regional cooperation mechanisms have been 
established to address the problem, including the Mérida Initiative involving the United 
States, Mexico and Central America; and the Regional Action Plan to Address the Growing 
Problem of Illicit Drug Trafficking, Organized Crime and Drug Abuse in West Africa, adopted 
by the 15 member nations of the Economic Commission of West African States (ECOWAS). 
Yet they appear to have produced only limited results thus far (Ribando Seelke and Finklea 
2013; Aning and Pokoo 2013). 
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4 Implications for policy analysis 
This discussion gives rise to several implications for policy analysis in countries and regions 
affected by (illicit) transnational activities and flows. Instead of focusing primarily on how and 
which national buffering institutions in the countries under stress should be strengthened, 
and how regional cooperation to tackle external stresses could be enhanced to reduce the 
risk of violence and instability, the focus should shift to addressing the following (non-
exhaustive list of) questions: 
 How is state fragility and vulnerability reinforced by the interrelationships 
between internal, external and transnational actors and variables? How could 
these interrelationships be restructured in such a manner that the risk of 
outbreaks or perpetuation of violence is mitigated? 
 Who are the losers and who are the winners? Which interests, in and outside 
of the affected country and region, are being promoted and safeguarded? 
How could the incentives for state and non-state actors to participate in illicit 
transnational activities and flows be changed? 
 Which (illicit) transnational activities and flows have a higher propensity to 
generate ‘new’ forms of violence in fragile and vulnerable states, and under 
which conditions? Under which conditions do they have stabilising effects? 
 Which policies designed to deal with (illicit) transnational activities and flows 
are likely to be most effective in preventing and mitigating violence, and which 
policies are likely to be least effective? 
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